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Construals of self and group: How Racial Nominalism can Promote Positive Intergroup
Outcomes for Interdependent Selves

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Abstract

Previous research has found that interdependent self-construals are related to poorer intergroup outcomes. Here we examine interdependent self-construal specifically in relation to comfort in contexts in which people are a numeric minority (i.e., outgroup comfort), and also examine the moderating roles of racial nominalism and racial essentialism. Among a racially diverse sample ($N = 577$), interdependent self-construals were related to more outgroup comfort. Two dimensions of racial nominalism—humanist and sociopolitical—were established with exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Humanist, sociopolitical, and essentialist beliefs about race were examined as moderators on the interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort relationship. Among participants of color with higher sociopolitical beliefs, and unexpectedly among participants with higher essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-construal was more positively related to outgroup comfort. Findings are discussed in relation to theory on self and group level construals, and the role of multicultural education for fostering sociopolitical beliefs about race.

Key words: Racial nominalism, racial essentialism, interdependent self-construal, outgroup comfort

**Construals of self and group: How racial nominalism can promote adaptive
intergroup outcomes for interdependent selves**

How people understand the concept of the self varies considerably; a predominant framework for understanding these variations is the distinction between the independent and interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991); respectively, the self is either seen as distinct from or embedded in social contexts. Self-construals have wide spread implications for people's psychological and social experiences; for example, relative to independent, interdependent self-construals have been found to be related to a cognitive tendency to attribute behavior to situation rather than disposition, and an emotional tendency towards socially engaged emotions such as guilt (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011). Of specific interest to this study is how interdependent self-construals are related to intergroup outcomes. Generally speaking, past research suggests that interdependent self-construals are related to greater challenges interacting across racial groups compared to independent selves. These findings are commonly explained by the notion that people who endorse interdependent self-construals have a stronger collective identity with ingroup members (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 2012; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 2005), but consequently to the detriment of regard for outgroup members (Duclos & Barash, 2014; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008; Nakashima, Yanagisawa, & Ura, 2013; Lee, 2005; Wang et al., 2015).

In an effort to understand the more prosocial aspects or adaptive functions of interdependent self-construals, we propose two contextual factors that may shift the pattern of findings of negative intergroup outcomes. First, we attend to the role of power dynamics in our analyses of the interdependent self-construal; specifically, we are interested in the relation between interdependence and people's degree of comfort while interacting in settings in which they are a numerical minority (i.e. outgroup comfort; Cole & Yip, 2008). We have some reason to suspect that interdependence may have more adaptive functions for people in outgroup contexts; particularly in more unwelcoming outgroup settings, interdependence may provide a means of safety or mitigation of hostility.

Second, the tendency to develop stronger collective identities and interdependence with *racial* ingroup members (to the exclusion of racial outgroup members) may be less pronounced among people who understand that races are socially constructed categories (i.e., racial nominalism) rather than naturally occurring entities (i.e., racial essentialism). Thus, among people with more developed nominalist understandings of race, we expect more positive intergroup outcomes for interdependence. Conversely, we expect essentialist beliefs about race to exacerbate intergroup outcomes for interdependence.

We expand on these arguments in the following review. First we examine more closely the concept of the interdependent self-construal, the body of research relating it to intergroup outcomes, and the smaller body of literature on interdependent self-construal that has specifically attended to power dynamics. We then examine more closely the concepts of racial nominalism and essentialism, how each of these constructs have been related to intergroup outcomes, and further develop our case for why racial nominalism may promote more positive intergroup consequences of interdependent selves.

Interdependent Self-Construal

In their seminal theory, Markus and Kitayama (1991) offered a distinction between an interdependent and independent self-construal. An interdependent self-construal is a way of understanding selfhood as inherently embedded in social contexts; the person draws relatively permeable boundaries between self and others. This way of understanding the self tends to be more common among people who are socialized in collectivistic cultures including many Asian cultures (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). By comparison, an independent self-construal is a way of understanding selfhood as distinct from social context; the person draws relatively rigid boundaries between the self and others. This way of understanding the self tends to be more common among people socialized in individualistic cultures such as the U.S. (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Of course within and across cultures there is tremendous variation among people with respect to their tendencies towards independent and interdependent self-construals.

These rather fundamental differences in understandings of self have numerous and profound consequences for people's psychological experiences including how people think, emote, and behave in relation to others. As examples, cognitively, interdependent self-construers tend to explain other people's behavior as reactions to situational circumstance

rather than inherent attributes (e.g., aggressiveness). Emotionally, interdependent self-construers tend towards other focused emotions such as empathy in lieu of more self-focused emotions such as sadness (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Behaviorally and relationally, interdependent self-construers tend to adjust their behavior in order to better fit in with present social settings and to prioritize harmony in relational interactions; for example, they may act relatively quiet and reserved when in the company of family elders, and more outgoing and talkative when with their peers (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In the next section, we examine research that has specifically examined how interdependent self-construals are related to how people tend to think and act in relation to others.

Interdependent Self-Construal and Intergroup Outcomes

Interdependent self-construals have rather consistently been related to preference for and stronger identification with the ingroup. We are aware of only a few studies that have examined interdependence in the context of power dynamics such as situations in which one has minority status (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Tawa & Suyemoto, 2010). Generally the body of literature on interdependent self-construals has employed either self-report survey assessment of self-construal (e.g., Singelis, 1994) or experimental methods in which subjects are “primed” with interdependent or independent self-construals, for example, by asking participants to visualize themselves as a subject in a short story written using either first-person singular pronouns (e.g., “I” to prime an independent self-construal) or first-person plural pronouns (e.g., “We” to prime an interdependent self-construal; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999).

Interdependence and intergroup behavior. Using self-report and experimental methods, researchers have found interdependent self-construals to be related to feelings of greater racial ingroup importance (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 2012), greater identification with racial and national ingroups (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Smith et al., 2005), and more positive feelings towards their ingroup (Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 2005). For example, Siy and Cheryan (2013) found that Asian Americans who endorsed interdependent self-construals were more accepting of positive stereotypes of Asian Americans compared to those with independent self-construals. Greater interdependence with ingroup members, however, appears to come at the expense of regard for outgroup members. Researchers have found interdependent self-construals to be related to less

generosity in resource allocation tasks to racial outgroup members (Duclos & Barasch, 2014; Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008), greater interpersonal stress (Nakashima, Yanagisawa, & Ura, 2013), less favorable attitudes towards racial outgroup members (Lee, 2005), and less neural activity indicating less empathy when watching videos of racial outgroup members (compared to ingroup members) experiencing pain (Wang et al., 2015). Regarding the later study, Chinese university students ($N = 30$) who were primed with interdependent self-construals demonstrated significantly greater neural responses in the left supplementary motor area, mid-cingulate cortex, and left insula when viewing Asian models experiencing pain relative to White models; yet no discrepancy was found when primed with independent self-construals (Wang et al., 2015). We are aware of only one study that has found adaptive intergroup outcomes for an interdependent self-construal; Yeh and Arora (2003) found that among a sample of professional school psychologists, interdependent self-construal was related to greater awareness and acceptance of similarities and differences between people.

Interdependence and intergroup behavior in contexts of power. Studies that have examined the role of situational power provide some peripheral support for the notion that interdependence may have an adaptive function in contexts in which people are a minority. African Americans who were placed in experimental groups and who were the only Black member of the group (i.e., solo status) consequently reported higher interdependent self-construals than African Americans placed in non-solo status experimental groups (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007). In a qualitative study, Asian American participants described interdependent self-construals as allowing them to fit in and minimize the potential impact of racism when they were in predominantly White social settings (Tawa & Suyemoto, 2010). Lastly, Howard, Gardner, and Thompson (2007) conducted a series of experiments, in which participants role played as power holders (i.e., real estate developers) engaged in a financial settlement with low-power group members (i.e., owner of a small carpentry business). When the scenario depicted the power holders as a group (i.e., a *team* of real estate developers), primed interdependent self-construals were related to less generosity in the financial settlement towards the low-power outgroup. However, when the scenario depicted the power holder as engaged in a one-on-one dispute with a low-power group member, interdependence was related to greater generosity towards the low-power group member. Presumably, in the context of group disputes, interdependence serves to heighten concern for one's group; however without an immediate referent group to extend ones

interdependence towards, interdependence was extended instead to the low-power outgroup member and was characterized as cooperation or at least, a more benevolent use of power (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007). Although not examined in this study, interdependence among those in low-power statuses may increase people's willingness to extend one's group boundaries to a more powerful outgroup, just as the high-power participants did with the low-power people in Howard Gardner, and Thompson (2007). Although these findings give us reason to suspect that interdependent selves will be related to more comfort in contexts in which people are a minority (i.e., outgroup comfort; Cole & Yip, 2008), none of these studies directly test this hypothesis. Such is the purpose of the current study.

In summary, interdependent self-construal has generally been found to be associated with favorable ingroup attitudes and behaviors and simultaneously poorer intergroup attitudes and behaviors. We have some reason to suspect that interdependent self-construal will have a more adaptive function in contexts in which people are a minority. The overall findings of negative relations of interdependent self-construals are somewhat counterintuitive given the prosocial tendencies of interdependent self-construers, as described earlier. Again, a common rationale is that people who endorse interdependent self-construals develop a stronger collective identity with ingroup members, but often to the detriment of regard for outgroup members. Yet, our perspective is that reserving interdependence for one's *racial* ingroup relies on the interdependent self-construers' supposition—the false supposition—that racial groups are real, fixed entities (i.e., racial essentialism). Thus, as people develop more nominalist notions of race, for example through education, interdependence may no longer be limited to racial ingroup members and may in fact be related to improved intergroup outcomes. The notably divergent findings in the Yeh and Arora (2003) study described above seems to support this hypothesis given that they used a sample of professional school counselors, many of whom had had previous multicultural educational experiences (an average of 5.2 multicultural workshops over the course of their career). Through multicultural education, the commonly held assumptions about racial essentialism may be supplanted with more socially constructed notions of race (i.e., racial nominalism).

Belief in Racial Nominalism

In addition to differences in understandings of self, social scientists recognize differences in how people understand social groups, including racial groups. An emerging framework for understanding differences in racial groups is the distinction between essentialist and nominalist understandings of race (Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Sundstrom, 2002; Tawa, 2018). Racial essentialism is the notion that races are naturally existing entities comprised of members who share inherent attributes and values, and among whom interrelations should occur naturally and seamlessly (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Tawa, 2017). On the other hand, racial nominalism is the notion that races were created and are maintained through social, historical, and political circumstance; for example, the idea that race was developed as a way to rationalize slavery (Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Sundstrom, 2002; Tawa, 2018). The impact of racial nominalism on intergroup outcomes has been scantily observed; moreover, the research that has been conducted on racial nominalism has tended to assess the extent to which racial essentialism is *not* endorsed (Kung et al., 2017; Shih et al., 2007; No et al., 2008), rather than directly measure racial nominalism. We argue here that racial nominalism is an active belief in its own right, not merely the absence or rejection of essentialism; in fact, there may be more than one type of racial nominalism.

In a recent qualitative study exploring college students' views about race, Tawa (2018) found that some participants described race as “socially constructed” insofar as they believed races shared a single human origin in Africa and that phenotypic variation in people was a result of geographic and climate-related adaptation concurrent with migration. We refer to this belief here as a “humanist” belief in race. On the other hand, some participants described races as “socially constructed” insofar as they believed that the idea of race—and the related assumption of inherent superiority of the White race—was created by people in positions of power (i.e., White people) in order to rationalize human atrocities such as slavery and the attempted genocide of Native Americans. We refer to this belief here as a “sociopolitical” belief in race. We believe a primary distinction between these two constructs is that sociopolitical beliefs in race includes an understanding of the role of power in the formation of race, while the humanist belief does not. Humanism may be more akin to what is referred to as a colorblind racial attitude (Neville et al., 2000). We are not aware of previous research distinguishing between various types of racial nominalism but do expect these variations in beliefs to have different moderating impacts on the relationship between

interdependent self-construals and outgroup comfort. We expand on these arguments below. First, however, we discuss the body of research examining how belief in race affects intergroup outcomes.

Racial Nominalism and Intergroup Outcomes

A considerable body of research has been conducted on racial essentialism which has relatively consistently been found to be related to negative intergroup outcomes (Chao, Hong & Chiu, 2013; Gaither et al., 2014; No et al., 2008; Tadmor et al., 2013; Tawa, 2016; Tawa, 2017; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008) such as less racial diversity in one's peer group (Williams and Eberhardt, 2008), and more outgroup discomfort (e.g., Tawa, 2017). The impact of racial nominalism has been more scantily examined. Moreover, the few self-report survey studies that have framed their analyses in relation to the impact of belief in race as socially constructed (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008; Shih et al., 2007) have generally used the same scales used to measure racial essentialism, simply coded in reverse. These findings do, however, support more adaptive intergroup outcomes: Asian Americans who endorsed more socially constructed views of race were found to be more likely to identify with and be more "cognitively assimilated" to the majority culture (No et al., 2008), and Hong Kong University students with greater belief in race as socially constructed had higher levels of trust towards outgroup members in intergroup settings (Kung et al., 2017). Both of these studies used No and Hong's (2005) 8-item scale (unpublished but described in No et al., 2008) in which the first four items measure people's endorsement of racial essentialism (e.g., "To a large extent, a person's race biologically determines his or her abilities and traits") and the last four items assess the extent to which people think of race as socially constructed (e.g., "Race does not have an inherent biological basis, and thus can be changed;" No et al., 2008, p. 1004). For this measure, a factor analysis did not support a 2-factor structure, thus, the authors recommend that social construction items be reverse scored to load positively on to racial essentialism, or, in the case of the above studies the racial essentialism items are reverse coded to indicate belief in race as a social construction (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008).

These researchers have also conducted studies to experimentally examine belief in race as a social construction (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008; Shih et al., 2007) and these findings are consistent with the self-report studies described above. For example, participants in a non-Asian, primarily White sample who were primed by writing a short

paragraph agreeing with a description of race as a social construction were less vulnerable to the impact of stereotype threat (i.e., the threat of poorer intellectual performance relative to Asians) on a lexical-decision task (Shih et al., 2007). Using similar primes, Kung et al. (2017) and No et al. (2008) replicated their survey findings described above. Thus, racial nominalism does appear to have an adaptive influence on intergroup outcomes. In the current study, we sought to examine the moderating impact of racial nominalism as well as racial essentialism on the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, and we sought to more directly measure belief in racial nominalism.

Racial Nominalism for Promoting Adaptive Intergroup Outcomes

The previous research reviewed above has relatively consistently found interdependent self-construal to be related to poorer relations across racial groups. Again, a common rationale for these findings is that people with interdependent self-construals develop a stronger collective identity with ingroup members (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 2012; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 2005), but often to the detriment of regard for outgroup members (Duclos & Barash, 2014; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008; Nakashima, Yanagisawa, & Ura, 2013; Wang et al., 2015). Yet, as we suggested earlier, we suspect that the tendency to reserve interdependence for racial ingroup members (to the exclusion of outgroup members) may be less pronounced among people who understand that races are socially constructed categories; racial nominalism may buffer the negative effects of interdependent self-construals and even promote or strengthen intergroup relations. If a person understands that races are malleable socially constructed categories with no inherent trait abilities and with whom one has no natural compatibility, then they are not likely to limit those included in their self-boundary to only racial ingroup members. To be sure, people—even those with highly developed nominalist understandings of race—may share affinity within racial ingroup members, perhaps based on the recognition of shared social experiences and for people of color, shared histories of racism. However, we suspect that boundaries will not be deterministically based on race membership. For example, a person of color with a highly developed nominalist understanding of race may include a close White ally with a strong understanding of racism in their self-boundaries.

Furthermore, we suspect that a humanist view may have more limited intergroup benefits compared to a sociopolitical view because it does not necessitate an understanding

of racism and power dynamics. In fact, people who endorse humanist views about race may simultaneously minimize the existence of racism, an ideology frequently referred to as a colorblind racial attitude (Neville et al., 2000). Colorblindness has been directly linked to poorer intergroup outcomes including greater marginalization within diverse social networks (Tawa, Ma, & Katsumoto, 2016) and greater prejudice (Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 2008). On the other hand, we expect that sociopolitical views about race will be related to an active rejection of colorblind racial views, and expect that sociopolitical racial nominalism will be considerably more effective in promoting adaptive intergroup relationships for interdependent individuals. We examine the relation of humanist and sociopolitical beliefs in race to colorblind racial attitudes only to more fully understand these constructs which are being developed in this study. We then pose our primary hypotheses as they have been developed in this review.

Hypotheses

Construct Validity Hypotheses

Hypotheses were developed to provide some validity for our measure of racial nominalism. Consistent with the emerging framework distinguishing between essentialist and nominalist views of race (Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Sundstrom, 2002; Tawa, 2018), we expected racial nominalism and essentialism to be inversely related. In addition, as discussed above, we examined the relation of racial nominalist beliefs to colorblind racial attitudes. We predicted:

- H₁*. Humanist belief in race will be negatively related to racial essentialism.
- H₂*. Sociopolitical belief in race will be negatively related to racial essentialism.
- H₃*. Humanist belief in race will be positively related to colorblind racial attitudes.
- H₄*. Sociopolitical belief in race will be negatively related to colorblind racial attitudes.

Primary Hypotheses

By focusing on contexts of situational power in which people are a numerical minority, and by considering variation in people's level of racial nominalism, we expected more adaptive intergroup outcomes for interdependent self-construals. Conversely, we expected that racial essentialism would have a negative impact on intergroup outcomes. We predicted:

- H₅*. Interdependent self-construal will be related to higher levels of outgroup comfort.
- H₆*. Humanistic belief in race will not moderate the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort.
- H₇*. Sociopolitical belief in race will moderate the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, such that among those with higher levels of sociopolitical belief in race, interdependent self-construal will be more positively related to outgroup comfort.
- H₈*. Essentialist belief in race will moderate the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, such that among those with higher levels of essentialist belief in race, interdependent self-construal be more negatively related to outgroup comfort.

Method

Procedures

Procedures for subject recruitment. Data were collected using an online survey. Participants were recruited in classrooms at the first author's university, on online survey hosting sites (i.e., Craigslist and Facebook), and through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Research assistants went into classrooms and provided links to the online survey and also posted a link to the survey on websites targeting major U.S. cities (e.g., New York, Los Angeles). Participants recruited in classrooms and online were incentivized with a chance to win a \$300 gift card to Amazon.com and those recruited on MTurk each received \$1.50 for completion of the survey.

Procedures for data cleaning. Survey research, particularly when collected online, is vulnerable to careless responding (Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). Meade and Craig (2012) have found that surveys that provided a warning prior to survey administration were significantly less likely to be completed carelessly than surveys with no warning. Thus, in the current survey administration, participants were warned that carelessly responding to items could result in their survey being removed from the pool of potential gift card winners or payment being withheld. IP addresses were examined and revealed no duplicates, thus there was no indication that a single person had completed the survey multiple times. In addition, the researcher examined completion time as an indicator of carelessly completed protocols (Huang et al., 2012). Research assistants completing the survey prior to its

administration estimated a completion time of approximately 20 minutes. Thus, protocols completed in less than 5 minutes were flagged and response patterns were examined manually. Among the 26 flagged protocols, 12 were comprised of obvious bogus response patterns and were removed leaving a final sample of 577.

Participants

Among the 577 participants, self-identified genders included: 217 male (37.6%), 348 female (60.3%), 2 transgender (0.004%), and 9 other (1.6%). Self-identified races included: 46 Asian (8.0%), 50 Black (8.7%), 52 Latino/a (9.0%), 8 Native American (1.4%), and 378 White (65.5%). Thirty-nine participants (6.8%) selected more than one race, and 4 (0.7%) selected no races. Collectively, non-White participants (i.e., Asian, Black, Latino/a, Native American, and multiracial) comprised 33.8% of the sample. Among the overall sample, 11.0% were immigrants. Participants' average age was 31.12 ($SD = 13.31$).

Measures

Belief in racial essentialism. Belief in racial essentialism was measured using the Beliefs About Race Scale (BARS; Tawa, 2017), which assess four types of essentialist beliefs about race (i.e., speciation, genotypic essentialism, phenotypic essentialism, and behavioral essentialism). Although the initial scale construction emphasized support for a four factor solution, fit indices for a bifactor model (a superordinate factor comprised of the four subscales) approached adequacy. In this study, our primary intent of using the BARS was to provide some construct validity for the measure of racial nominalism by establishing its distinction from the broader construct of racial essentialism. We did not have specific hypotheses related to the four types of racial essentialism in relation to racial nominalism. Thus, for the sake of parsimony, BARS items were examined as a single measure of belief in racial essentialism. A sample item is: "During an autopsy, the race of a person can be determined by examining bone structure." This scale is comprised of 16 items that are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (6). Thus the possible range of computed scores is 16 to 96; scores in the current sample ranged from 16 to 86 ($M = 49.48$; $SD = 12.25$). The Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the current sample was $\alpha = .82$.

Colorblind racial attitudes. The Colorblind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000) is a 20 item scale designed to assess the extent to which people minimize or deny the social significance of race and reject the notion that racism still exists. A sample

item is: “Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem today” (Neville et al., 2000). This scale is comprised of 20 items that are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). Thus the possible range of computed scores is 20 to 120; scores in the current sample ranged from 20 to 114 ($M = 58.19$; $SD = 18.96$). The CoBRAS has demonstrated adequate stability over time (Neville et al., 2000). Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the current sample was $\alpha = .92$.

Interdependent self-construal. Interdependent self-construal was measured using a 15-item version of the Singelis Self-Construal Scale (SCS; Singelis, 1994); this version added three items to the original 12-item SCS to improve internal reliability (Singelis & Brown, 1995). A sample item is: “I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.” The 15 items in this scale were scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). Thus the possible range of computed scores is 6 to 90; scores in the current sample ranged from 15 to 88 ($M = 59.87$; $SD = 9.88$). A Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the current sample was $\alpha = .80$.

Outgroup comfort. Outgroup comfort was initially developed to assess Black students’ levels of comfort in predominantly White universities (Cole & Yip, 2008), but has also been examined for multiple racial group members in minority status contexts (e.g., a White attendee at a predominantly Black social gathering; Cole et al., 2011). A sample item is: “I can enjoy myself at a party even if there aren’t many other people of my race there.” All items include some aspect of being a numerical minority (i.e., low power). This scale is comprised of 15 items that are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). Thus the possible range of computed scores is 15 to 90; scores in the current sample ranged from 24 to 90 ($M = 75.60$; $SD = 12.79$). A Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the current sample was $\alpha = .93$.

Belief in racial nominalism. We are not aware of a previously existing scale assessing multiple dimensions of racial nominalism, thus, a scale was constructed for the current study. The researcher and two research assistants developed items based on statements made by participants in the qualitative study described in Tawa (2018). In order to run exploratory factor analyses (EFA) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) with

separate samples, the data were split into two equal size data sets using random assignment, with 288 participants assigned for the EFA and 288 participants assigned for the CFA. This division of participants is sufficient based on guidelines approximating 10 participants per item for EFA (Osborne & Costello, 2004) and a total of 200 - 300 participants for CFA (Meyers, Ahn, & Jin, 2011). An EFA using principal axis factoring and specifying 2 factors with an oblique (Direct Oblimin) rotation was examined. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score of .82 indicated that the sample size was adequate. Factor loadings supported the presence of both a humanist belief in race (H) and a sociopolitical belief in race (SP). All factor loadings using the EFA sample were higher than the .32 threshold recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007; see Table 1).

The fit of the racial nominalism scale was examined using CFA; we examined a one-factor (all 11 items as a single factor) and the two factor solution. Comparisons were based on five model-fit indices and their guidelines: The ratio of the Chi-Square statistic to degrees of freedom should range between 1 and 3; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean Square (SRMR) should approach statistical significance ($p < .05$); and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) scores should reach between .90 and .95 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). The two factor approached adequacy and was a stronger fit than the one-factor model (see Table 2). In the last step, modification indices were examined in order to improve the fit of the two factor model by including correlated error variances between item pairs. The use of modification indices can be justified when used sparingly and when modifications are theoretically plausible (Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). Thus, correlations of error variances were limited to four item pairs, and only when item pairs occurred within the same subscale (1 and 2; 1 and 5; 7 and 9; 8 and 9). The modified two-factor model was adequate as indicated by all five fit statistics (see Table 2).

The 5 items comprising the humanist (H) scale and the 6 items comprising the sociopolitical (SP) scale are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). Thus the possible range of computed scores for the humanist scale is 5 to 30 (scores in the current sample ranged from 5 to 30; $M = 22.91$; $SD = 4.78$) and the possible range of scores for the sociopolitical scale is 6 to 36

(scores in the current sample ranged from 6 to 32; $M = 21.45$; $SD = 3.56$). Cronbach alpha reliability estimates were examined with the full data set (H scale $\alpha = .72$; SP scale $\alpha = .86$).

Results

Construct Validity of the Racial Nominalism Scale

As expected, the humanist subscale of the racial nominalism scale was negatively related to racial essentialism (H_1), however the sociopolitical subscale was not (H_2). Both humanist and sociopolitical subscales were negatively related to colorblind racial attitudes; this relation was unexpected for the humanist subscale (H_3) but was expected for the sociopolitical subscale (H_4 ; see Table 3).

Preliminary Analyses of Group Differences

We tested group differences on interdependent self-construal, outgroup comfort, and each belief about race by participant race, gender, and immigration status (See Table 4). Participants of color had significantly higher levels of interdependent self-construal, racial essentialism, sociopolitical belief in race, and lower levels of humanistic belief in race compared to White participants. Females had higher levels of outgroup comfort and lower levels of racial essentialism than males. Immigration status was not related to any of the study variables. Age was negatively correlated with interdependent self-construal ($r = -.17$; $p = .00$), and marginally negatively correlated with sociopolitical belief in race ($r = -.09$; $p = .03$). Given that participants' race was significantly related to all of the independent variables (i.e., interdependent self-construal, racial essentialism, and both subscales of racial nominalism), we controlled for participant race in all of our primary analyses.

Primary Analyses

For the primary analyses, all variables were first standardized to ease interpretation. Consistent with our hypothesis (H_5), interdependent self-construal was positively related to outgroup comfort ($r = .22$; $p < .001$). This relationship was not affected by participant race [$R^2\Delta = .00$; $F(1, 572) = .70$; $p = .40$]. For hypotheses 6 through 8, we examined how the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort was affected by varying levels of humanist (H_6), sociopolitical (H_7), and essentialist (H_8) beliefs about race. We also examined whether these self and group level interactions differed by participants' race. These hypotheses were examined using one hierarchical regression. In the first step of the model, we entered interdependent self-construal, participant race, and all three beliefs about race (humanist, sociopolitical, and essentialist); in the second step, we added all two-

way interactions involving interdependent self-construal and participant race and all two-way interactions involving beliefs about race and participant race. The beliefs about race were not allowed to interact with each other. In the third step, we added the three-way interaction terms involving interdependent self-construal, each belief about race, and participant race (see Table 5).

Based on the first model, higher interdependent self-construal was related to greater outgroup comfort controlling for the three beliefs about race and participant race, consistent with H_1 [$\beta = 0.27$, $t(570) = 6.86$, $p < .001$]. Additionally participant race was related to outgroup comfort such that people of color had higher outgroup comfort controlling for interdependent self-construal and beliefs about race [$\beta = 0.19$, $t(570) = 2.24$, $p = .03$]. Next we examined how beliefs about race interact with interdependent self-construal and participant race to predict outgroup comfort.

Humanist Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model there was no significant evidence that humanist beliefs about race predicted outgroup comfort above and beyond all other predictors (interdependent self-construal, participant race, sociopolitical beliefs about race, and essentialist beliefs about race [$\beta = .07$, $t(570) = 1.79$, $p = .07$]. In the second model there was no significant evidence that the effect of interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort was moderated by humanist beliefs about race [$\beta = -.06$, $t(563) = -1.70$, $p = .09$] or that humanist beliefs about race moderated the effect of participant race on outgroup comfort [$\beta = -.06$, $t(563) = -.68$, $p = .49$]. In the final model, there was no significant evidence that the degree to which humanist beliefs about race moderates the effect of interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort depends on participant race ($\beta = -.11$, $t(560) = -1.12$, $p = .26$). Overall, these results suggest that controlling for other beliefs about race (including essentialist and sociopolitical) humanist beliefs about race do not have a notable relationship with outgroup comfort particularly with respect to interactions with interdependent self-construal or participant race.

Sociopolitical Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model there was no significant evidence that sociopolitical beliefs about race predicted outgroup comfort above and beyond all other predictors [$\beta = -.06$, $t(570) = -1.45$, $p = .15$]. In the second model there was no significant evidence that the effect of interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort was moderated by sociopolitical beliefs about race [$\beta = .03$, $t(563) = .95$, $p = .34$]. In the final model, the degree to which sociopolitical beliefs moderated the effect of

interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort depended significantly on participant race [$\beta = .18$, $t(560) = 2.19$, $p = .03$]. Comparison of conditional effects (by participant race) suggested that for people of color, sociopolitical beliefs about race significantly moderated the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort [$\beta = .17$, $t(560) = 2.39$, $p = .02$]; for Whites, it did not [$\beta = -.01$, $t(560) = -.12$, $p = .90$]. We used regression coefficients to create “prototypical plots” (Singer & Willet, 2003) for interpretation of the moderating effect of sociopolitical beliefs for people of color (see Figure 1). Consistent with our prediction (H_7)—at least among people of color—those with higher sociopolitical belief in race had a stronger positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort compared to those with lower sociopolitical belief in race. Overall, these results suggest that sociopolitical beliefs about race seem to play a unique role in the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort among people of color.

Essentialist Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model, there is a strong relationship between essential beliefs about race and outgroup comfort such that higher essentialist beliefs about race predict less outgroup comfort controlling for interdependent self-construal and the other beliefs about race [$\beta = -.42$, $t(570) = -10.87$, $p < .001$]. In the second model there was a significant interaction between interdependent self-construal and essentialist beliefs about race [$\beta = 0.11$, $t(563) = 3.51$, $p < .001$]. This means that those higher on essentialist beliefs about race will have a more positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, inconsistent with our prediction (H_8). Prototypical plots were created for interpretation of the significant interaction (see Figure 2). In the final model, there was no significant evidence that the interaction between interdependent self-construal and essentialism beliefs about race depended on participant race [$\beta = -.07$, $t(563) = -.78$, $p = .44$]. To summarize, some of these results are contradictory to our hypotheses. We see an overall negative relationship between essentialist beliefs about race and outgroup comfort, which is expected. However, we expected that the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort would become more negative for those higher on essentialist beliefs about race compared to those who are lower. Instead, we found that for those higher on essentialist beliefs about race the relationship between interdependent self-construal was more positive and did not depend on participant race. These results were fairly surprising and warrant further study.

Discussion

In a recent review paper of the role of the self in group relation processes, Hogg, Abrams, and Brewer (2017) call for research that addresses complexities in people's understandings of "us" and "not us" boundaries; over 20 years of research consistently demonstrates that developing more complex group identities that weaken ingroup and outgroup distinctions can simultaneously foster more inclusive identities and lessen prejudice and negative affect towards outgroups. Our study responds to this call, both in content—by examining how complex beliefs about self and groups interact to impact intergroup outcomes—but also in method, by offering an instrument that allows for the measurement of people's understandings of group boundaries. In this discussion, we consider some remaining questions as well as new questions that arise from some unexpected findings, and suggest some future applications for the study of racial nominalism in self and identity research.

To summarize our findings briefly, we found that as a primary relationship interdependent self-construals were related to more outgroup comfort. As expected, sociopolitical belief in race had a moderating effect on the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, but only for people of color. Among people of color with higher sociopolitical belief in race, interdependent self-construal was related to more outgroup comfort; among those with lower sociopolitical belief in race, interdependent self-construal was unrelated to outgroup comfort. Also as expected, humanist belief in race did not impact the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort. Our expectation that essentialism would exacerbate the impact of interdependent self-construal was not supported. In fact, the opposite was found; among those with higher essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-construal was also related to more outgroup comfort, and among those with lower essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-construal was unrelated to outgroup comfort.

Our finding that interdependence is related to more outgroup comfort is unique relative to the body of literature that has tended to find harmful intergroup outcomes. To be sure, our intent is not to simply imply that the inverse is true—that interdependence is always related to adaptive intergroup outcomes—rather our intent is to raise complexity regarding the persistent finding that interdependence necessarily results in poor intergroup outcomes.

Outgroup comfort, unlike many other intergroup measures, is specifically designed to assess comfort in situations in which one is a numerical minority. Thus, interdependence may be an adaptive mechanism within contexts in which one lacks situational power. Interdependent self-construals may be particularly adaptive for people of color for whom being a minority in a social context is a common—if not every day—experience. Adjusting one's self to fit in when they are a minority in a social context may be one way in which people of color find comfort and safety, while still preserving strong ethnic and cultural identities. We are reminded here of Loren's proclamation in Lee Mun Wah's *The Color of Fear*, that he: "...can't wait to go home [from work] and become a Black man again." This finding is consistent with Tawa and Suyemoto's (2010) qualitative study examining the function of self-construals for Asian Americans, in which participants discussed interdependent self-construals as allowing them to fit in with the dominant majority to minimize marginalization and racism.

Interdependence was also related to greater comfort interacting in outgroup settings among White participants, and thus may also serve an adaptive function for White people in situations in which they are a numerical minority. As the dominant majority, interacting in outgroup settings may be more of an option rather than inevitability. Seen another way, failing to adjust one's behavioral tendencies in outgroup settings may lead White people to feel greater discomfort, and ultimately may lead to greater avoidance of situations in which they cross cultural borders. For White people and professionals, developing interdependent self-construals may be one means by which they achieve cultural competence and sensitivity, and the ability to work and interact comfortably in cross-cultural settings.

The finding that higher levels of sociopolitical understandings of race can increase the positive impact of interdependent self-construals for people of color supports our perspective that people who understand that races are malleable social categories with no inherent trait abilities, are less likely to limit those included in their self-boundary to only racial ingroup members. We would also encourage future researchers to examine how the development of sociopolitical beliefs about race may work to *buffer* the negative impact of interdependent self-construals on intergroup outcomes that was found in the research described earlier (e.g., Duclos & Barash, 2014). In addition, these findings point to the role that multicultural education can play in de-pathologizing people of color. By teaching sociopolitical notions of race, educators can provide contexts in which people of color can

retain cultural values of interdependence and even use these cultural strengths to develop positive relations across groups. Yet, it seems that these educational interventions need to include a discussion of racism and power in the conceptualizations of race; it may not be enough to simply debunk biological notions of race in favor of more humanistic ones. Our finding of positive relations of interdependence are echoed by only one other study in our review, the study by Yeh and Arora (2003), which was conducted with a participant pool of school counselors, with an overall high level of exposure to multicultural counseling, and perhaps more nominalist notions of race. Further research should more directly examine how racial nominalism can be imparted through education, and the role of multicultural education to promote positive intergroup relations.

An additional contribution of our study is the development of a measurement tool for directly examining two beliefs about race, which have to our knowledge not been previously examined: humanist and sociopolitical. Our findings further support the importance of examining these dimensions of racial nominalism as separate constructs, and the importance of not simply measuring “socially constructed” beliefs about race by reverse scoring essentialist beliefs about race as has been done in previous research (e.g., Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008). In fact, while humanist belief in race was negatively correlated with essentialism, sociopolitical belief in race was not correlated with essentialism.

As predicted, unlike sociopolitical beliefs, humanism did not have a moderating effect on the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort. Our expectation was that humanism would not benefit people with interdependent self-construals in minority settings because it does not necessitate an understanding of racism and power structures. However, contrary to our expectations, humanism was related to *more* awareness of racism (i.e., lower levels of colorblindness). Thus, at this point we are uncertain about why humanism and sociopolitical views differently interact with interdependence, and such an area of inquiry would be fruitful for further research. Furthermore, although not a focus of our study, we did find that each beliefs of race had a different direct relationship with outgroup comfort; essentialism was related to less comfort, humanism was related to more comfort, and sociopolitical beliefs did not have a direct relationship to outgroup comfort (see Table 3). Thus, humanism may have an even greater *direct* benefit for intergroup relations than sociopolitical beliefs. Sociopolitical beliefs may have a more conditional relationship to outgroup comfort; for example, a person of color

who is in a stage of developing an understanding of how race was developed as a way to justify slavery may have an understandable, if only temporary, discomfort in White social settings. Again, a greater understanding of the humanist and sociopolitical constructs should be explored in future research.

Although for the whole sample essentialism was directly related to less outgroup comfort, our regression analyses suggest that among people with higher levels of essentialism, interdependent self-construals were related to *more* outgroup comfort; this latter finding was quite contrary to our predictions. We expected that essentialism would only serve to increase interdependent self-construers' tendency towards ingrouping, and consequently adversely impact intergroup relations. In fact, this finding is particularly challenging in light of the notion that from a wider theoretical lens, greater complexity in understanding group boundaries should generally improve intergroup outcomes (Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017). Yet, this theoretical inconsistency offers an opportunity to further our understanding of the infinitely complex interaction between the self and group. One possibility is that people who are relationally sensitive and who commonly derive a sense of self from group settings (i.e., interdependent self-construers), may be particularly vulnerable to discomfort in outgroup settings. Our findings suggest that *both* sociopolitical and essentialist theories may provide such people with a means of finding comfort in outgroup settings. Sociopolitical beliefs seem to work for people of color to break down "us" and "not-us" boundaries while simultaneously preserving an understanding of how power differently affects the experiences of White people and people of color. In the absence of formal education in which sociopolitical beliefs are learned, essentialism may be a default means of finding comfort in outgroup settings. Social identity theory has long recognized that in order for people to draw a sense of self-worth and regard from their ingroup membership, they must first assume some sense of stability and fixedness in boundaries that differentiate one's ingroup from their outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Having a theory that draws sharper boundaries between "us" and "not us" (Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017) may provide some measure of predictability, stability, and comfort in outgroup settings for interdependent self-construers, even if it more generally takes a toll on outgroup relations. Again, however, we caution interpretation here given that our SEM analysis of this interaction was inconsistent with the regression analyses.

Overall, the aim of this paper was to examine some contexts in which interdependent self-construals may be related to more adaptive intergroup outcomes. We have found the emphasis on negative social consequences of interdependent self-construals to be troubling given that this view of self is more common in many non-Western cultures (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), and such findings seem to—at least tacitly—argue for a cultural assimilation trajectory of people endorsing non-Western cultural values. Thus, in the interest of cultural plurality, it behooves us to continue developing an understanding of the ways in which interdependent self-construals can have potentially positive impacts on intergroup interactions.

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Table 1. EFA Factor Loadings*, Means, and Standard Deviation for Racial Nominalism Scale Items

	Item Description	H	SP	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1	Scientifically speaking, all human beings, regardless of their race, are descendants of a single maternal ancestor (Mitochondrial Eve)	.51		4.71	1.36
2	All members of all racial groups are members of the same human family	.46		5.05	1.29
3	We all share the same ancestors that originated in Africa	.80		4.34	1.60
4	People with ancestors near the equator often have darker skin because their ancestors had a greater need for melanin to protect them from the sun	.48		4.75	1.25
5	Human beings originated in Africa and changes in physical appearance (e.g., skin color) occurred as they migrated into different climates	.75		4.23	1.58
6	Race was a social concept invented to rationalize slavery in the United States		.74	3.10	1.68
7	Race is a way to create divisions between people in order to create a hierarchical order		.72	3.64	1.69
8	Race was not created in order to oppress people ®		-.78	3.45	1.69
9	White people did not create the idea of race as a way to rationalize slavery ®		-.81	3.34	1.56
10	Although race is not real, biologically speaking, race still influences how people are treated in society		.49	4.64	1.40
11	The concept of race was created by White people for the purpose of maintaining power and privilege		.84	3.39	1.62

* all loadings of less than .40 are suppressed for visual clarity

Note. H = Humanist belief in race; SP = Sociopolitical belief in race.

Table 2. Model Fit Statistics for 1-Factor, 2-Factor, and 2-Factor (modified) Solutions.

Factors	X^2	X^2/df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
1	346.93**	7.89	.70	.63	.16	.12
2	160.94**	3.74	.88	.85	.10	.07
2-modified	95.44**	2.45	.95	.92	.07	.06

** $p < .01$

Note. X^2 = Chi Square; X^2/df = Chi Square / degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square.

Table 3. Correlations among Study Variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Humanist	-	.28**	-.24**	-.31**	.12**	.18**
2. Sociopolitical		-	.01	-.32**	.29**	.05
3. Essentialist			-	.42**	.13**	-.39**
4. Colorblind				-	-.07	-.27**
5. Interdep. SC					-	.22**
6. OGC						-

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Note. Humanist = Humanist belief in race; Sociopolitical = Sociopolitical belief in race; Essentialist = Essentialist belief in race; Colorblind = Colorblind racial attitudes; Interdep. SC = Interdependent self-construal; OGC = Outgroup comfort.

Table 4. Tests of Group Differences on Primary Study Variables.

	INT	OC	E	H	SP
Race	$\lambda = .95; F = 14.84^{**}; \eta_p^2 = .049$				
White	58.96 ^b (10.20)	75.05 (12.85)	48.25 ^b (12.27)	23.33 ^a (4.67)	21.08 ^b (3.39)
Non-White	62.08 ^a (8.68)	76.87 (12.56)	51.83 ^a (12.26)	22.11 ^b (4.91)	22.17 ^a (3.78)
Immigration	$\lambda = .99; F = 2.31; \eta_p^2 = .008$				
U.S. Born	59.72 (9.76)	75.64 (12.63)	49.13 (12.18)	23.03 (4.75)	21.39 (3.53)
Immigrant	61.40 (10.48)	75.95 (13.68)	52.14 (12.40)	21.98 (4.90)	21.81 (3.79)
Gender	$\lambda = 1.00; F = 0.13; \eta_p^2 = .000$				
Male	59.24 (10.30)	72.83 ^b (13.94)	51.54 ^a (12.65)	23.02 (4.81)	21.47 (3.53)
Female	60.39 (9.54)	77.29 ^a (11.79)	48.31 ^b (11.89)	22.83 (4.78)	21.43 (3.61)

^{a-b} difference is significant at $p < .01$; ** MANOVA test for H and SP is significant at $p < .01$

Note. INT = Interdependent self-construal; OC = Outgroup comfort; E = Essentialist belief in race; H = Humanist belief in race; SP= Sociopolitical belief in race.


Table 5. Hierarchical Regressions on Outgroup Comfort.

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Step 1				.24	-
INT	0.27**	0.04	[0.20 ~ 0.35]		
H	0.07	0.04	[-0.01 ~ 0.15]		
SP	-0.06	0.04	[-0.14 ~ 0.02]		
E	-0.41**	0.04	[-0.49 ~ -0.34]		
POC	0.19	0.08	[0.02 ~ 0.35]		
Step 2				.52	.03**
INT	0.32**	0.05	[0.22 ~ 0.41]		
H	0.08	0.05	[-0.02 ~ 0.18]		
SP	-0.14**	0.05	[-0.24 ~ -0.04]		
E	-0.45**	0.05	[-0.54 ~ -0.36]		
POC	0.17*	0.08	[0.00 ~ 0.33]		
INT x H	-0.06	0.04	[-0.13 ~ 0.01]		
INT x SP	0.03	0.03	[-0.03 ~ 0.10]		
INT x E	0.11**	0.03	[0.05 ~ 0.17]		
POC x INT	-0.13	0.09	[-0.31 ~ 0.05]		
POC x H	-0.06	0.09	[-0.24 ~ 0.11]		
POC x SP	0.18*	0.09	[0.01 ~ 0.35]		
POC x E	0.04	0.09	[-0.13 ~ 0.21]		
Step 3				.52	.01
INT	0.30**	0.05	[0.21 ~ 0.39]		
H	0.09	0.05	[-0.02 ~ 0.18]		
SP	-0.15**	0.05	[-0.24 ~ -0.05]		
E	-0.44**	0.05	[-0.53 ~ -0.35]		
POC	0.17*	0.09	[0.00 ~ 0.34]		
INT x H	-0.04	0.04	[-0.12 ~ 0.04]		
INT x SP	-0.01	0.03	[-0.08 ~ 0.07]		
INT x E	0.12**	0.03	[0.05 ~ 0.19]		
POC x INT	-0.13	0.09	[-0.31 ~ 0.05]		
POC x H	-0.02	0.09	[-0.20 ~ 0.16]		
POC x SP	0.11	0.09	[-0.07 ~ 0.29]		
POC x E	0.06	0.09	[-0.12 ~ 0.23]		
INT x POC x H	-0.11	0.09	[-0.29 ~ 0.78]		
INT x POC x SP	0.181*	0.08	[0.02 ~ 0.34]		
INT x POC x E	-0.07	0.09	[-0.23 ~ 0.10]		


* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Note. INT = interdependent self-construal; H = humanistic belief about race; SP = sociopolitical beliefs about race; E = essentialist belief about race; POC = person of color vs. White.

Figure 1. Moderation of Sociopolitical on Interdependent Self-Construal and Outgroup Comfort for People of Color



Note. “Low” is one standard deviation below the mean and “high” is one standard deviation above the mean.

Figure 2. Moderation of Essentialism on Interdependent Self-Construal and Outgroup Comfort

Note. “Low” is one standard deviation below the mean and “high” is one standard deviation above the mean.